DOD Protective Design Manuals Have Wide Application - PDF (Page 17)
Patrick Lindsey, PE, Protective Design Center, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, NE
Patrick Lindsey, PE, Protective Design Center, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, NE
Factors such as site selection, building location of the site, use of fences and clear space, as well as vegetation and structural reinforcements are all critical to protecting a building and its occupants from various threats. Incorporating protection into a facility's design is the best way to achieve a desired level of protection at a reasonable cost. Patrick Lindsey of the Protective Design Center summarizes many of the key features and considerations to be accounted for, and introduces the DOD resources available.
The AMPTIAC Quarterly
Volume 6, Number 4
Many manuals are available within the DOD to aid engineers
in the design of facilities subjected to blast loadings from
bombs. Facility design in consideration of exterior blast loadings
starts with locating a site that is adequate for the facility
and level of protection required. The design basis threat (as
defined by the installation master planning team) identifies the
weapons, tools and tactics that could be used in an attack
against the facility. The site or master planners then review the
site plan and the design basis threat to determine if the amount
of standoff distance that is available can provide a proper level
of protection. The planners will then incorporate the use of
controlled and non-controlled perimeters, locate appropriate
exclusion or non-exclusion zones, define the standoff distances,
and identify facility clear zones. They will also locate the facility's
entry control points for vehicles and personnel. Should the
site be inadequate for a structure built with standard construction
techniques, then blast loadings will need to be accounted
for to give the facility the same level of protection at the
reduced standoff distance.
Background History of Standards
Military Hardened Structures Progression
Since the invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel in 1866, blast
effects on structures have been observed. In 1870, Rankine and
Hugoniot published their analytical solution to normal shocks
in an ideal gas and these relationships have formed the foundation
for studying gas dynamics and the interaction of shock
waves with structures. It is well known that internal blasts are
more damaging than exterior blast effects as the shock and gas
pressure combine to act on the structure.
In the last 50 years, the engineering units within the Military
developed many mathematical models to capture the structural
interaction with blast waves. After World War II, these models
started to show development when damage levels for masonry
structures we re correlated to crater size, crater location, and
explosive weights used in bombing runs. Damage level was a
measure of the amount of structure remaining based on the blast
pressure and impulse the structure experienced from those
bombs. From those early days of the 1950's other observations
were noted that relate the many blast parameters to scaling laws,
thus making it easy for engineers to develop models for predicting
categories of damage based on: weight of explosive, range,
and type of structure. The 1950's were also the beginning of the
nuclear age, and many design ideas were developed during this
era. A lot of the bunker mentality commonly associated with
explosive effects came from this time period.
Anybody who has handled explosives knows the dangers
associated with that endeavor, as many accidents have occurred
as a result of their handling. A vast amount of knowledge was
acquired from accident investigations of catastrophic events. To
protect personnel, a Tri-Service group from the Army, Navy
and Air Force was formed to develop a manual to give engineers
a procedure that lets them design "Structures to Resist the
Effects of Accidental Explosions" (commonly known as technical
manual TM 5-1300). The primary purpose of the manual
is to present methods for protective construction used in facilities
for the development, testing, production, storage, maintenance,
modification, inspection, demilitarization, and disposal
of explosive materials. This manual was used as the standard for
explosive effects for about thirty years. By using this manual,
engineers could design structures to resist the effects of blast
waves and fragments preventing the propagation of explosive
effects from one structure to the next, or to prevent the mass
detonation of explosives and provide protection to personnel
and valuable equipment. Instrumental to this approach was a
well-developed understanding of:
- the blast load parameters
- the response of structures to blast loads
- how to establish proper details for construction to develop the proper structural response
- establishing guidelines for siting explosives facilities.
Technical manual TM 5-855-1, "Fundamentals of Protective
Design for Conventional Weapons" also came out of the post-
World War II era. While this manual is dedicated to the design
of structures to resist conventional weapons, during the 1970's
great advances were made in the area of numerical modeling of
nuclear weapon effects. These include the effects of dynamic
response of aboveground, and belowground structures to airblast,
blast-induced ground shock, cratering, and the response
of various materials to these effects. These modeling techniques
were then applied to the conventional weapons arena and the
manual has been updated several times since its original printing.
This manual and TM 5-1300 deal with primarily concrete
and steel structures, but not everybody works in those types of
structures. Additional work has produced more data on how
conventional construction responds to blast loads and that data
has been incorporated into the new design guidance.
After the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon in
1983, the DOD looked for a group to develop procedures that
could be implemented to prevent this type of incident from
recurring. The Army established the Corps of Engineers
Protective Design Center to take on this mission and its main
purpose was to provide physical security and antiterrorism protection
to military assets. The first document created by this
group was called the Security Engineering Manual, which
became the TM 5-853 series of manuals on security engineering.
Much of the blast and fragment technology developed for
TM 5-1300 and TM 5-855-1 had direct application to the area
of security engineering. Within this series of manuals, aggressors,
weapons, tools and explosives are defined to develop a
design basis threat against specific assets. With this information
protective measures are designed to counter these threats and
protect the defined assets.
The physical security portion is that part of security concerned
with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel;
prevent or delay unauthorized access to equipment, installations,
material, and documents; and to safeguard against
espionage, damage, and theft. Prior to this period, many of the
regulations were not interrelated or tied to design procedures,
and at times it was difficult to determine what level of protection
was being provided for an asset. This manual brought
threats and protective measures together as a security engineering
design procedure, balancing the design basis threat against
the level of protection.
The antiterrorism aspects of facility design are the defensive
measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and
property to terrorist attacks and often include a limited
response and containment of the aggressor by local military
forces, or a response force. Therefore, security engineering is
the process of identifying practical, risk-managed short and
long-term solutions to reduce and/or mitigate dynamic manmade
hazards by integrating multiple factors, including
construction, equipment, manpower, and procedures.
Continue reading in AMPTIAC Special Issue Quarterly - PDF 68 Pages.
Military Hardened Structures Progression
Application of DOD Manuals to Antiterrorism
Security Engineering Definitions
Controlled Perimeter
Standoff Distance
Level of Protection
Nonexclusive Zones
Clear Zones
Facility Clustering
Lines of Sight
Minimum Measures
Controlled Perimeter
Standoff Distance
Level of Protection
Nonexclusive Zones
Clear Zones
Facility Clustering
Lines of Sight
Minimum Measures
Entry Control Points
Approach Road
Visitor and Truck Access Control Center
Entry Control Point
Gates and Barriers
Approach Road
Visitor and Truck Access Control Center
Entry Control Point
Gates and Barriers
Site Planning
Vantage Points
Minimum Standoff Distances
Unobstructed Space
Railroad Location
Vantage Points
Minimum Standoff Distances
Unobstructed Space
Railroad Location
Building Layout
Parking Beneath Buildings
Drive-up / Drop Off
Superstructure
Building Location
Asset Location
Parking Beneath Buildings
Drive-up / Drop Off
Superstructure
Building Location
Asset Location
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